Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

George S. Whitting et al v. Charles R. Clayton et al :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Nick J. Colesides; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants;
Mark Nick Mascaro; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Whitting v. Clayton, No. 16543 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1815

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE S. WHITTING, JUDITH
SILVA and DANIEL SILVA,
d/b/a JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants

]
]
]
]

]
]
]

vs.

]
]

CHARLES R. CLAYTON, Mayor
of Midvale City, et al.,
and MIDVALE CITY, a
municipal corporation,

Case No. 16543

]
]
]
]
]

Defendants and
Respondents.

]
]
]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

MARC NICK MASCARO
7417 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Respondents
NICK J. COLESSIDES
610 East South Temple
Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants

F! LED
ft' 11.R 1 4 1980

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE S. WHITTING, JUDITH
SILVA and DANIEL SILVA,
d/b/a JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants
vs.

Case No. 16543

CHARLES R. CLAYTON, Mayor
of Midvale City, et al.,
and MIDVALE CITY, a
municipal corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

MARC NICK MASCARO
7417 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Respondents
NICK J. COLESSIDES
610 East South Temple
Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF CASE . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

POINT III

POINT IV

RESPONDENTS PROPERLY REVOKED THE
BUSINESS LICENSES OF APPELLANTS
AND SAID DECISION MUST STAND
UNLESS SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS . . . . . . . . . . .

10

RESPONDENTS REVOKED THE APPELLANTS'
BUSINESS LICENSE UNDER PROPER
AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . .

18

WHERE THE MIDVALE CITY COUNCIL
CONDUCTED A HEARING COMPORTING
WITH DUE PROCESS AND HEARD
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 7-2, 7-10, 4-35 OF THE
REVISED ORDINANCES OF MIDVALE
CITY (1951), THE SAID CITY COUNCIL
WAS AUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO SECTION
7-18 OF SAID ORDINANCE AND SECTIONS
10-13-6 AND 32-4-17, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED, TO
REVOKE PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS
LICENSES. . . . . . . . . . . .

24

APPELLANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO
ASSERT THAT SECTION 7-18 OF THE
REVISED ORDINANCES IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT
PERMITS THE REVOCATION OF A
BUSINESS LICENSE WITHOUT A
HEARING . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANTS
DO HAVE STANDING, SECT ION 7 -18 OF
THE MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES IS NOT
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS BY VIRTUE OF THAT
ORDINANCE ALLOWING A LICENSE
REVOCATION BY THE CITY COUNCIL WITH
OR WITHOUT A HEARING.

31

POINT VI

SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES
OF MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISANCE
SO AS TO INCLUDE ACTS OF AN
ESTABLISHMENTS'S PATRONS DOES NOT
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL
PROTECTION.
34

POINT VII

SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES
OF MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISANCE,
DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY
INSUFFICIENT DEFINITENESS OR FAILURE
TO GIVE NOTICE AS TO THE CONDUCT
37
PROHIBITED.

POINT VIII

THE CITY COUNCIL'S CHARGE AND
FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 4-25 OF THE
REVISED ORDINANCES OF MIDVALE CITY,
REQUIRING LICENSING OF A DANCE HALL,
WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHTS BY REASON OF THEIR LACK OF
NOTICE OR BY DISCRIMINATORY
40
ENFORCEMENT .

POINT IX

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO ENTERTAIN RESPONDENTS' MOTION
AND AMEND ITS ORDER

42
44

CONCLUSION.

ii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES CITED
Anderson v. Utah County Board of County
Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979).

11

Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978).

30

Cantrell v. Carnutt, 458 P.2d 594, 80 N.M.
519 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.·

33

Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 3 6 Colo App .
345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . .

40

Condas v. Board of Salt Lake County
Commissioners, 5 Utah 2d 1, 295 P.2d 829 (1956).

40

Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Central Weber
Sewer Improvement District, 4 Ut. 2d 105, 287 P .2d
884 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

Earl & Sons Tire Center, Inc. v. City of
Boulder Board of Appeals, 559 P.2d 236
(Colo. 1977)
....... .

41

Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 374, 423 P.2d
657 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed
27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) .

13

Floeck v. Board of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194, 100
p .2d 225 (1940) . . . . . . . .

32

Hanover Ltd v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977)

13

Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d
53 (1971) . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .

43

Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976).

13

Kochendorfer v. Board of City Commissioners
of Douglas County, 93 Nev. 419, 566 P.2d
1131 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12, 21,
26

Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).

14

New Safari Lounge, Inc. v. City of Colorado
Springs, 567 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1977). . . . . . . . .

33

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
iii OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES CITED
(continued)
Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Commission, 15 Or. App. 20. 514 P.2d 888 (1973)
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah, 1976).

27
11,14,
26

People v. Montoya, 137 Cal App. 784, 28 P.2d
101 (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333,
481 P.2d 669 (1971) . . .
. ....

30

Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035
(Utah 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

State Board of Equalization of California v.
The Superior Court in and for the City and
County of San Francisco, 5 Cal. App 2d 374,
42 p . 2d 1 07 5 (193 5) . . . . . . . . . . . .

33,34

State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. 355, 517 P.2d
212 (1973). . . .
. ....

42

State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d
561 (1952). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

Strader v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement
System, 206 Kan. 392, 479 P.2d 860 (1971)
Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of
Police Commissioners of the City of Los
Angeles, 169 Cal App. 2d 188, 337 P.2d
203 (1959). . . . . . .
. ....
Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles,
101 Cal Rptr. 768, 496 P.2d 840 (1972) . .

The Grog House, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Commission, 12 OL App. 426, 507 P.2d 419 (1973)
iv

17,31

12. 22,
3 6,38

21,36'
37,38,
40
22.25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES CITED
(continued)
Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber
526 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1974) . . . . . :

44

Wade v. Fuller, 12 Utah 2d 299, 365 P.2d
802 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35,37

Wallace v. Mayor of the City of Reno,
27 Nev. 71, 73 P 528 (1903) . . . . . . .

21,32

Webster v. Board of County Commissioners of
City of Adams, Colo. App. 539 P.2d 511 (1975).

12

AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-60

2,19

Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-13-6

22,27

Utah Code Annotated, Section 32-4-7.

27

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65(b).

8

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65(b)(2)

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a).

43

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(b).

42,43

Midvale City Ordinances, Section 4-25.

7,17

Midvale City Ordinances, Section 4-34.

29

Midvale City Ordinances, Section 7-2
Midvale City Ordinances, Section 7-10.
Midvale City Ordinances, Section 7-18.

v

7,16,17,
29,34,37
7,17,29
4, 6, 7.

17' 28. 29,
34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TEXTS CITED
Page
Anno. 35 A.L.R. 2d 1067 (1945) .

32

McQuillin, Municipal Corporation

§

24.64

19

McQuillin, Municipal Corporation

§

26.81

31

McQuillin, Municipal Corporation

§

26.83

22

McQuillin, Municipal Corporation

§

26.93

10

wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil § 2582 (1971)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
vi
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE S. WHITTING, JUDITH
SILVA and DANIEL SILVA,
d/b/a JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants
Case No. 16543

VS.

CHARLES R. CLAYTON, Mayor
of Midvale City, et al.,
and MIDVALE CITY, a
municipal corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants initiated this action in the Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, Utah,
praying for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the
ruling of the City Council of the City of Midvale, which revoked the business licenses held by Appellants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding, entered
its Order affirming the action of the City Council of the City
of Midvale.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the District Court's
Order which upheld the revocation of Appellants' business
licenses.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, George S. Whiting, Judith Silva and Daniel
Silva, made application to Midvale City, a municipal
corporation, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
for a retail beer license, as partners in a partnership
doing business under the name of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB on
December 13, 1976 (TR 292).

Said license was issued and

receipt for the fees made December 17, 1976 (TR 291(1)).
From the time of the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB at
7980 South State Street, Midvale, Utah, numerous complaints
had been made by citizens in the immediate vicinity of
JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB (TR 293, 294), the complaints being made
by the citizens, including that of disturbing the peace, foul
language, drunkenness, fights, parking in residential areas,
littering, drag-racing, making public nuisance and destroying
the residents' quiet enjoyment of their property (TR 292(2)(3)).
As a result of the numerous complaints received by the Mayor,
City Council and Police Department with respect to JUDD'S
FRONTIER CLUB, Midvale City Corporation, by its Mayor, Boyd
N. Twiggs, wrote a letter to George S. Whiting of JUDD'S
FRONTIER CLUB, dated September 29, 1977, setting forth various
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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methods of resolving the complaints against JUDD'S FRONTIER
CLUB (TR 20, 21).

Again, on November 16, 1977, a letter

was sent by Midvale City Corporation, through its Mayor,
Boyd N. Twiggs, to George S. Whiting of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
informing him of the many complaints in the area with
respect to noise, fighting, lack of parking, broken glass
and debris in street, and urinating in public.

Appellants

were informed at that time, that these problems had not
existed prior to the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB.
The City again requested that remedial action be taken and
that if the effectiveness of these measures would not solve
the problem within thirty (30) days that Midvale City would
consider suspending the licenses of Appellants (TR 18, 19).
Thereafter, the Respondents, Midvale City Corporation,
prepared a Petition and Notice of Charges (TR 282-288),
and an Order to Show Cause, (TR28G-281), ordering the
Appellants to appear before the Midvale City Council on
the 26th day of April, 1978 at the hour of 7:00P.M., then
and there to show cause, if any they had, why their licenses
should not be suspended or revoked for the reasons as set
forth therein.

Said Petition and Notice of Charges and Order

to Show Cause was served personally upon Judith Silva for
the Appellants and upon Richard Leedy, Esq., Attorney for
Appellants, on the 13th day of April, 1978 (TR 160, 280, 288
(5)(6)).

Thereafter, Richard J. Leedy, Attorney for Appellants,
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brought suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, seeking a Temporary
Restraining Order against Respondents from holding said
revocation hearing.

The Order to Show Cause on the Temporary

Restraining Order was initially set for April 21, 1978, but
was continued to May 4, 1978, at which time, Marc Nick Mascaro
appeared for the Respondents and Richard J. Leedy appeared
for the Appellants.

On May 8, 1978, David K. Winder, District

Judge, denied Appellant's Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order or Preliminary Injunction.

Respondents, Midvale City,

rescheduled the Order to Show Cause hearing for May 16, 1978
at the hour of 6:00P.M., which said notice was served by
mailing a NOTICE OF HEARING to Richard J. Leedy, attorney for
Appellants, the 9th day of May, 1978 (TR 289).
Pursuant to the above NOTICE OF HEARING on May 16, 1978,
Midvale City, a municipal corporation, brought the Order to
Show Cause hearing against JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB to consider
the suspension or revocation of the club's licenses and
regulatory licenses pursuant to Section 7-18, REVISED ORDINANCES
OF MIDVALE CITY, 1951, and such other inherent powers as are
vested in the City Council of Midvale City.

Richard J.

Leedy appeared as attorney for Appellants (TR 153, 154, 159,
164, 165-75), having accepted service for said hearings
(TR 160); Judith Silva and Daniel Silva were also present
(TR 156, 161).

Marc Nick Mascaro, Midvale City Attorney,
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S

appeared for Respondents.

At that time, members of the

Midvale City Council received evidence and took testimony
from Respondents' witnesses.

At the conclusion of Respondents'

evidence, the Appellants presented no evidence (TR 267).
Based upon the evidence and testimony taken at the hearing,
the Midvale City Council, on May 30, 1978, at a special
council meeting, at which time, Mr. Richard J. Leedy,
attorney for Appellants, was present, entered its Findings of
Fact and Order (TR 102-106), finding INTER ALIA, that since
the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB in Midvale City, the
residents in the immediate vicinity of said club, had
experiences fights, (TR 180, 187, 188, 227, 232, 249 and 260),
excessive noise (TR 179, 182, 193, 206, 221, 223 and 232),
extreme parking problems (TR 193, 199, 205, 214, 215, 218,
219, 227, 232, 260), broken .beer bottles and litter (TR 179,
181, 182, 188, 200, 205, 206, 213, 215, 223, 227, 234, 247,
260, urinating in public (TR 181, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201,
205, 207, 225, 227, 232, 234, 247, 260), vulgar and indecent
language (TR 179, 181, 194, 206, 223, 227, 232, 260), intoxicated individuals (TR 220, 232, 233, 260), destruction of
private property (TR 181, 193, 199, 205, 214, 221, 227), loss
of rents and tenants in apartment units (TR 206, 214), loss
of quiet enjoyment of private residences (TR 179, 193, 194,
201, 202, 213, 214, 220, 223, 224), diminished property values
(TR 207, 224), personal injuries (TR 214, 227, 236), drag

5
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racing (TR 182, 206), narcotics (TR 260).

The City Council

further found that said activities were carried on by the
patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB as evidenced by the testimony
of neighbors and police officers and by the acknowledgements
of patrons (TR 179, 181, 189, 191, 194, 200, 205, 210, 211,
225, 227, 234, 245 and 260).

Testimony from long-time

residents of the immediate vicinity of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB,
with residency ranging from two and one-half (2-1/2) years
to thirty five (35) years, indicated that the residents had
had no prior problems of the nature above-described prior
to the establishment and opening of JUPD'S FRONTIER CLUB
(TR 179, 181, 192, 193, 198, 200, 205, 209, 213, 215, 217,
221, 223, 224, 226 and 234).

Of the eight (8) residents

called, six (6) testified that the above activities carried
on by the patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB took place at
least three (3) to five (5) nights each week (TR 182, 194,
215, 217, 223, 228 and 262).

Based upon the testimony and

evidence of the above activities, the Midvale City Council
found that said activities were contrary to the public
peace and morals of the citizens of Midvale City, and therefore, in contravention of Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY
ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised (TR 102, 103).

The City

Council further found that the above-named activities were
carried on with the knowledge of Appellants, who were sent
letters September 29, 1977 (TR 20) and November 16, 1977
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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(TR 18), notifying Appellants of said conduct.

That said

activities constituted a nuisance pursuant to Section 7-2,
MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised, and that
violations of Section 7-2 and 7-18 of the MIDVALE CITY
ORDINANCES of conduct tending to affect the public peace and
morals of Midvale City, was grounds for revocation of
Appellant's licenses

(TR 103, 104).

The City Council further found that Appellants were
allowing public dancing without a license in violation of
Section 4-25, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, as revised (TR 104, 105),
and that said violation was grounds for revocation under
Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES.

The City Council

further found that on the nights when Appellants were allowing public dancing, beer was being sold in contravention of
Section 7-10, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised,
which violation was grounds for revocation pursuant to
Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES (TR 105).

The Council

further found that based upon the testimony that the City was
spending between one-third (1/3) and one-half (1/2) of its
police force time patroling JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB which caused
serious problems with respect to the protection of the
property and residents in other parts of the city, (TR 214,
232, 233,234, 235, 261, 262);

that said conduct was

contrary to the public peace and morals of Midvale City all
in contravention of Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES,
1951, as revised, and was grounds for revocation of Appellants'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,7administered by the Utah State Library.
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licenses (TR 103, 104).

Based upon the above findings of

the Midvale City Council, it voted on May 30, 1978, to revoke
the business license, beer license and three (3) amusement
device licenses of Appellants by a vote of three (3) for
revoking all licenses, one abstaining and one absent (TR
105, 106).
Thereafter, Appellants, through their attorney, Richard
J. Leedy, filed a Verified Complaint in the Third District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, challenging
the revocation hearing held by Midvale City Council and
the ordinances used therein (TR 2-8).

Subsequent to various

hearings, Appellants, through their attorney, Nick J.
Collesides, filed a Verified Amended Complaint and Petition
for Extraordinary Writ, dated January 26, 1979 (TR 82-86).
Respondents filed an Answer to the Verified Amended Complaint and the Verified Complaint on January 31, 1979
(TR 90-94), and pursuant to the Order of Judge Bryant H.
Croft, certified the record of Midvale City Corporation to
the Third Judicial District Court (TR 100).
The matter came on for judicial review before the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge,
presiding on the 12th day of June, 1979, pursuant to Rule
6S(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to review the
action of Midvale City Council in revoking Appellant's
licenses.

Nick J. Collesides appeared for Appellants and
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Marc Nick Mascaro appeared for Respondents.

On June 25, 1979, the Court reviewed the transcript of
the City Council's hearing, the record on appeal, the Findings
of Fact and Order of the Midvale City Council, heard oral
arguments from both counsel and affirmed the action of the
Midvale City Council (TR 128, 129).

The Court thereafter

on July 3, 1979, entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (TR 137-142),

finding~~;

that the action of

the City Council was within the statutory authority of that
body to act; that the evidence given at the hearing was
sufficient to support the action revoking the said licenses;
that said action was based upon competent evidence; that
the said hearing comported with all requirements of due
process and equal protection; that the said ordinances were
constitutional; and that the action of Midvale City Council
was not arbitrary or capricious.

Based upon its Findings

of Fact and Conclusionsof Law, the Court entered its
Amended Order of Judgment dated July 3, 1979, affirming the
action of the Midvale City Council (TR 143, 144).

On June 27, 1979, Appellants filed their Notice of
Appeal (TR 130), and on August 20, 1979, Appellants filed
an Amended Notice of Appeal from the Judgment entered
July 3, 1979 (TR 304).

9
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POINT I
RESPONDENTS PROPERLY REVOKED THE BUSINESS
LICENSES OF APPELLANTS AND SAID DECISION
MUST STAND UNLESS SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well established law that Courts will not attempt
to control or interfere with the discretion of a municipal
legislative body relative to the granting or denying of a
license or a revocation or cancellation thereof.

All

reasonable doubts as to the correctness of the licensing
authorities' rulings should be resolved in its favor.

Accord-

ingly, Courts will not question or set aside license or permit requirements or exactions, or the granting, denial or
revocation of licenses or permits by municipal authorities,
except for oppressiveness, discrimination or clear abuse of
power or discretion.
Section 26.93.

9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,

This Honorable Court has consistently follow-

ed the general applicable law above stated.
The review power of the District Court over administrative actions is set forth in Rule 65(b)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, wherein relief in the form of an Extraordinary Writ is permitted in the following situations:
Where an inferior tribunal, Board or Officer
exercising judicial function has exceeded its
jurisdiction or abused its discretion.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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In exercising that review power, this Court in the
case of Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners,
589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), held that the licensing of a
business:
. . . should not be destroyed nor disrupted
arbitrarily, nor without following fundamental
standards of due process of law to guard
against capricious or oppressive administrative
action.
. . . the operating business should have its
license renewed unless there is some reasonable
basis for denying it. (emphasis added) Id. at

mr.

Because the record of the trial court and
particularly its findings upon which the
judgment is based, fail to demonstrate any
reasonable ground for the refusal to renew the
license, ~t is our conclusion that judgment
should be and is hereby vacated. (emphasis
added) Id. at 1217.
Thus, this Court has clearly established the standard that
if there is any reasonable basis for the denial of a license,
the decision of the administrative tribunal must stand.
This Court in the case of Peatross v. Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, (Utah 1976),
spoke to the review power of the District Court over administrative actions .
. . . where the lower tribunal, acting within
the scope of its authority, has conducted a
hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing court will examine only the certified
record; and will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the actions of the lower
tribunal except upon a showing that the
tribunal acted in excess of its authority or
in a manner so clearly outside reason that its
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action must be deemed
arbitrary. Id.at 284.

capr~c~ous

and

Thus, it is clear that the action by the administrative
tribunal must stand unless the decision rendered is "so
clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary."
The Supreme Court of Nevada announced a similar standard
of review in Kochendorfer v. Board of County Commissioners
of Douglas County, 93 Nev. 419, 566 P.2d 1131 (1977).

In

that case, the Court quashed a Writ of Mandamus and reinstated
the order of the Board revoking a six-month temporary liquor
license on the basis of excessive noise complaints.

The

Court therein held that the burden of proof was on the
applicant to show that the Board had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.
Similarly in Webster v. Board of County Commissioners
of City of Adams, Colo. App. 539 P.2d 511 (1975), the
Colorado Supreme Court explained that the decision of an
administrative board is arbitrary and capricious where it is
based upon evidence from which reasonable men, fairly and
honestly considering the evidence, could only reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by the board.
Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. App. 2d 188,
337 P.2d 203 (1959), is in accord.

The Court stated that the

City's Board of Police Commissioners, acting as a quasi
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judicial body, and was empowered to make final ajudications
of fact with regard to matters properly submitted to it.
A Court in reviewing such decision, has no right to judge
the value of the evidence or weigh it.

The Court is only

to decide if there is substantial evidence to support the
findings and should disregard all evidence contrary to those
findings.
This Court, in speaking of its review power of District
Courts, has consistently held that where there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to support the findings of a trial
court, the findings will not be overturned.

In Holman v.

Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976), this Court stated:
The policy of this court has been, after
reviewing the record, not to disturb the
trial court's findings if there is any
reasonable basis and evidence to support
it. Appellants carry out the burden of
showing from the record that the lower
court erred.
See also First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons

& Reed, 27 Utan-2d 1, 492 P.Zd. 132 (1971).
The recent case of Hanover Ltd v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751
(Utah 1977), explains the standard which Appellants must
meet if the trial Judge's findings are to be reversed.

The

Court stated:
In regard to the remaining assertions of
error this court is constrained to look
at th~ whole of the evidence in the light
favorable to the trial court's findings,
including any fair inferences t? be drawn
from the evidence and all the c~rcumstances
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shown. The trial court's findings shall
not be disturbed unless the evidence-rssuch that all reasonable minds would be
persuaded to the contrary. (emphas~s
added) Id. at 753.
Even when the parties to an action each produce evidence
supporting its action, this Court has consistently refused
to reverse the trial Court unless the evidence is so convincing that reasonable men could not differ as to the
results which the evidence dictated.

Koesling v. Basamakis,

539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).
Thus, it is clear that the trial Court will not be overturned if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to
support the findings.

At the same time, the Appellant must

show that "all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the
contrary" before the lower Court can be reversed.
The relief the Appellants seek on appeal is a
Restraining Order against the Respondents "until the Complaint on file with the District Court has been heard on
its merits".

It would seem that the Appellants in essence,

are again asking for an evidentiary hearing or trial de novo
in the District Court.

This Court in Peatross, supra, held:

The standard rule is that the appellate
jurisdiction is the authority to review the
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal
upon the record made in that tribunal, and
to aff~rm, mod~fy or reverse such action or
judgment.
. . . where the Defendant Board had conducted
a hearing that comported with due process
requirements, and where there is no express
statutory grant of a trial de novo, the
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l

I

plaintiff was mistaken in her insistence that
she was entitled to one as a matter of right.
555 P.2d at 284.
The Court went on to indicate that because the issuance of
an Extraordinary Writ was in the nature of a proceeding in
equity that the trial Court could take evidence if it thought
that the interest of justice so required.

See also Denver &

Rio Grande Railroad v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement
District, 4 Ut. 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955).
THE EVIDENCE
In this matter, there is clearly a reasonable basis in
the evidence to support the findings of the trial court and
the findings of the Midvale City Council, Respondent's herein.
In the hearing before the Midvale City Council hel.d May 16,
1978, the City produced eight (8) property owners who resided
in the immediate vicinity of said business.

Those residents,

who had lived in the area from two and a half (2-l/2) to
thirty five (35) years, testified that prior to the commencement of business by the Appellants, there had been no
problems of the nature which they were experiencing. (See
Statement of Facts, page 6)

These residents testified of

fights, noise, parking problems, litter, urinating in public,
foul language, intoxication, destruction of property, loss
of rents, loss of tenants, loss of the quiet enjoyment and
use of their property, diminished property values, personal
injuries and drag-racing.
5 and 6)

(See Statement of Facts, pages
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The City Council and District Court properly found that
these actions were contrary to the public peace and morals
of the citizens of Midvale City (TR 103, 138).

The Midvale

City Council and District Court further found, based upon
the above testimony of these injurious activities, that
they constituted a nuisance pursuant to Midvale City Ordinance
7-2 (1951, as revised), (TR 104, 140).

The Respondents and

the District Court further found that the Appellants were
aware of the activities of their patrons and were notified
on several occasions of these problems (TR 104, 140) .
At the hearing, the City further produced testimony
from two (2) police officers who had been with the Midvale
City Police Department for ten (10) years and six (6) years
respectively, who testified that the Appellants were allowing dancing, open to the public, and that said dancing was
being carried on without a proper license as required by
Midvale City (TR 104, 141).

Said officers further testified

and the City Council and District Court found that liquor
was being sold during the time that public dancing was being
carried on in Appellants' business location, which is in
violation of Midvale City ordinances (TR 105, 141).
The City Council heard substantial testimony that the
injurious activities set forth above were being carried on
by the patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB (see Statement of
Facts, pages 6 and 7), and further, that the Midvale City
Police Department was spending an inordinate amount of time
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policing the Appellants' business all to the detriment of
the rest of the citizens of Midvale City (see Statement of
Facts, page 7), and the District Court so found (TR 141).
Appellants would indicate that the Midvale City Council
acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

However, the record as

set forth hereinabove, is replete with injurious activities
which constitute conduct contrary to the public peace and
morals of Midvale City and in violation of the ordinances
therein named.
Appellants elected at the public hearing on May 16, 1978,
not to introduce any controverting evidence (TR 140, 267).
Their attempt to present their entire evidence at the District
Court level was improper.

In Strader v. Kansas Public

Employees Retirement System, 206 Kan. 392, 479 P.2d 860 (1971),
the Court held that the Plaintiff could not secure independent
review of an administrative proceeding:
We would suggest that a party appearing before
an administrative body cannot produce his
evidence piecemeal. He cannot produce part
of his evidence before an administrative agency
and then produce the balance on judicial review.
Id. at 868.
To allow the Appellants to have an evidentiary hearing or
trial de novo would be contrary to law and justice in this
matter.

The Midvale City Council had the benefit of

observing the witnesses during their testimony and saw the
evidence produced.

They found sufficient evidence to revoke

Appellant's licenses for violation of Section 7-18, 7-2, 4-25
and 7-10, Midvale City Ordinances, (1951, as revised).

The
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District Court had the benefit of the certified record on
appeal and reviewed the same.

That Court, on review, found

sufficient evidence to affirm the revocation of Appellants'
business licenses and found that said evidence was competent
and neither arbitrary nor capricious (TR 141).
Appellants would have this Honorable Court believe that
the trial Court did not rule on every issue raised in its
Verified Complaint and Amended Verified Complaint.

However,

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and
Amended Order of Judgment entered by the trial Court found
upon each and every issue raised by Appellants on review
(TR 128, 129, 137, 144).

Based upon the findings made by

Midvale City Council and the trial Court, this Court should
uphold the decision of the District Court and lower tribunal.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS REVOKED THE APPELLANTS'
BUSINESS LICENSE UNDER PROPER AUTHORITY.
Appellants contend that, to halt the raucous activities
at and around JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB, Respondents were required to bring an action for the abatement of a nuisance,
an action which, they state, is "exclusively within the
province of the district and subject to the Rules of the
Civil Procedure" (sic).
This reasoning is erroneous on several points.
18

First,
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assuming arguendo that the City of Midvale were required to
abate the nuisance rather than to revoke the license, the
Utah State Code does indeed give a municipality such power:
[Municipalities] may declare what shall be
a nuisance, and abate same, and impose fines
upon persons who may create, continue or
suffer nuisances to exist.
Utah Code Annotated, §10-8-60 (emphasis added).
McQuillin is in accord, contrary to Appellants' assertions.
The section quoted in portion by Appellants (Appellant's
Brief, p. 7) reads in full as follows:
§

24.64.

To declare particular thing or
business a nuisance.

The power of a municipal corporation to define,
declare, and deal with nuisances is restricted,
the view has been taken, to defining, declaring
what constitutes, and dealing with nuisances in
general or with a class of things as nuisances,
and is not a power to declare a particular thing,
such as a building, a nuisance. A municipal
legislative body's pronouncement that a particular
industry, e.g., an oil refinery, is a nuisance,
where neither charter nor ordinance makes it a
nuisance, is not a legislative determination but
an unauthorized judicial pronouncement; it is
a counterpart of the case where an ordinance
provides that no one shall carry on a certain
business in the absence of a permit without
specifying any standard for the issuance of the
permit. Under a general ordinance setting a
standard of un~form a !~cation, however, a
act~n
~n an
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6 Mcquillan, Municihal Coraorations, § 24.64
(3rd Ed. 1964) (emp asis a ded; footnotes
omitted).
The later statement, upon which Appellant so strongly
relies (that a business may be declared a nuisance after a
finding by a Court of competent jurisdiction in the premises)
clearly means, when read in the context of the entire section,
only that if a Court finds a business to be a nuisance, a
municipality may follow suit.

It does not, as Appellant

contends, state that a judicial hearing is required before
a municipality may revoke a license on nuisance grounds.
Section 76-10-808 of the Utah State Criminal Code, to
which Appellantrefers in his brief, does provide for the
abatement of nuisances, but it is by no means the exclusive
vehicle for doing so.

That section merely empowers the state

attorney general, county attorney or city attorney to bring
an action, either civil or criminal, for the abatement of a
nuisance or install other appropriate penalties.

Section

78-38-1, to which Appellant also refers, is even further off
point.

It merely provides that a private

~.

whose

personal enjoyment is affected by a nuisance, may sue for
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an abatement.
More importantly, however, Appellant, in his labored
attempt to bring the City Council's action within the purview
of nuisance abatement, fails to realize that the revocation
of a license and the abatement of a nuisance are not mutually
exclusive remedies.
The Courts, have, on numerous occasions, upheld the
power of municipalities to refuse or revoke business licenses
on nuisance grounds, as in Wallace v. Mayor of the City of
Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528 (1903).

There the City Council's

revocation of a retail liquor dealer's license was upheld
where there was reason to believe the business constituted
a nuisance, a menace to public health, and a detriment to
peace or morals.
More recently, in Kochendorfer v. Board of County
Commissioners of Douglas County, supra, the Court of that
state quashed a Writ of Mandamus and reinstated the order of
the board revoking a six-month temporary liquor license on
the basis of noise complaints.
Similarly, Sunset Amusement Company v. Board of Police
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3rd 64,
101 Cal. Rptr. 768, 496 P.2d 840

(lW~.

concerned the propriety

of a municipality refusing to renew a business license where
such business created a public nuisance.

Reviewing the

board's findings that the business in question caused considerable disruption in the vicinity of the roller rink,
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including fights, a high crime incidence, public drunkenness
and a general law enforcement problem in the area, the Court
upheld the municipality's denial of a license renewal.
The Court reached the same conclusion in Sultan Turkish
Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of
Los Angeles, 169 Cal. App.2d 188, 337 P.2d 203 (1959),
sustaining the board's business license revocation where the
establishment created a public nuisance.
Also on point is The Grog House, Inc., v. Oregon Liquor
Control Commission, 12 Or. App. 426, 507 P.2d 419, 423 (1973),
where the Court upheld the commission's refusal to renew a
liquor license, noting evidence of "disorderly, illegal
operations over a period of several months which grossly
disturbed a neighborhood."
It is ironic that Appellant places so much reliance on
McQuillin to bolster his position; for that authority himself
states:
A license to carry on a business which affects
health, safety, morals or the public welfare
may be revoked by virtue of the police power.
Where the granting of a license or permit forms
a part of the police system of the state, as in
the sale of intoxicating liquors, the authority
which grants the license always retains the
power to revoke it . . .
9 Mc~uillin, Municipal Corporations,
ed. 964).

§

26.83 (3rd

That the Midvale City Council has such licensing power is
clear under Utah Code Annotated,

§

10-13-6:

10-13-6. License of specified businesses.-- They
may license, tax, regulate, suppress and prohiDit
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(emphasis added).
Appellants' position is confusing and untenable.

While they

state in the first section of their brief that the City
Council, who concededly granted their business license, was
required to bring an action for an abatement of a nuisance,
they later state in another section that "[t]here is little
question that the revocation of a liquor license itself
ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of the body which
has been delegated such power"

(Appellants' Brief, p. 10).

On the same page, they also state that:

"a business license

may be revoked by the issuing authority for legal cause; with
that Appellants do not quarrel."
As the cases clearly show, the City Council acted within
proper authority when, in the interest of public welfare,
peace and morals, it revoked the Appellants' business licenses.
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POINT III
WHERE THE MIDVALE CITY COilltCIL CONDUCTED A
HEARING COMPORTING WITH DUE PROCESS AND
HEARD EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7-2,
7-10, 4-35 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
MIDVALE CITY (1951), THE SAID CITY COUNCIL
WAS AUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO SECTION 7-18 OF
SAID ORDINANCE AND SECTIONS 10-13-6 AND
32-4-17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AS
AMENDED, TO REVOKE PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS
LICENSES.
Appellants contend that the evidence before the City
Council established insufficient grounds for revocation and
that, as a matter of due process, he was entitled to a trial
de~

before the District Court.

Appellants base such

contention, in part, on the argument that the three (3) weeks
which they were given to prepare their case before the Midvale
City Council hearing of May 16, 1978 were inadequate.
The trial Court found that the Defendants were given
notice of an Order to Show Cause hearing for April 26, 1978,
pursuant to a Petition and Notice of Charges dated April 12,
1978, which Order to Show Cause and Petition and Notice of
Charges was served upon Judith Silva, a partner of Appellants,
and Richard J. Leedy, Esq., attorney for Appellants, on
April 13, 1978 (TR 280, 288 (5 and 6), 160).

After a
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continuance of the original setting, a subsequent Notice of
Hearing was served upon Richard J. Leedy, attorney for
Appellants, on May 9, 1978, for a hearing to be had May 16,
1978 (TR 289).

The Court further found that the hearing held

by Midvale City Council on May 16, 1978, comported in all
respects with those requirements of due process and equal
protection under the constitution; that Appellants were represented by counsel, Richard J. Leedy, Esq.; and that two (2)
members of the partnership, namely Judith Silva and Daniel
Silva, were present at said hearing (TR 138, 140).

The trial

Court further found that a full and complete hearing was had
on the matter before the Midvale City Council, but that the
Appellants elected not to introduce any controverting
evidence at that time (TR 138, 140).

The trial Court further

found that after said hearing, the Midvale City Council took
the matter under advisement and on May 30, 1978, entered its
decision revoking the business license, Class B Beer License
and three (3) amusement device licenses of Appellants, at
which time, Richard J. Leedy, Esq., attorney for Appellants,
was present (TR 138).
In The Grog House, supra, the Court held that one-and-one
half (1-1/2) days were sufficient preparation time where "the
evidence against petitioners was overwhelming testimony concerning disorderly, illegal operations over a period of several
months which grossly disturbed a neighborhood."
423.

507 P. 2d at

The Court noted that the evidence before the commission
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showed that the Appellant had been repeatedly warned by
police of the shortcomings of his establishment and that
"this was the kind of evidence, if there had been contra
evidence, that would have been readily rebuttable."

Id.

In this matter, the trial Court concluded as a matter
of law that the Respondents conducted a hearing comporting
in all respects with due process and equal protection; that
the hearing was held within the scope of the Respondent's
authority; and that the tribunal acted upon competent and
sufficient evidence and that their actions were neither
arbitrary nor capricious (TR 140, 141).

The trial

Co~t

further upheld the constitutionalityof the ordinances used
in the revocation, 7-18, 7-2 and 4-25 (TR 141).
the decison should stand.

Therefore,

See Peatross, supra.

The Supreme Court of Nevada in the Kochendorfer, supra,
noting that the central elements of due process are notice
and hearing appropriate to the case, found that any due
process rights of Plaintiff's which might have been violated
by a first hearing without notice were amply protected by a
second hearing within a ten-day notice, the presence of counsel
and an opportunity to be heard.

The Court also found that

there was sufficient evidence to support the board's
revocation based on maintenance of a public nuisance and the
diminished value of adjoining property.
Appellants also maintain that the City Council's dual
function as Prosecutor and Judge is violative of due process.
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Nevertheless, the Court, in Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon
Liquor Control Commission, 15 Or. App. 20, 514 P.2d 888
(1973), rejected such a challenge:
The case law, both federal and state,
generally rejects the idea that the combination with judging or prosecuting or
investigating functions is a denial of
due process .
Id. at 895, quoting 2 Davis, Administrative
Law, Section 13.02 (1958).
The combination of prosecutory and adjudicatory
functions in a single agency is not considered to be a violation of due process
guarantees.
Id. quoting 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law,
J!9 (1965).
In the case at bar, the City Council is authorized by
Utah Code Annotated, 10-D-6 and 32-4-17, (1953) as amended,
to license, regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquor and beer.

Those sections state:

10-13-6. License of specified businesses.--The
license, tax, re ulate, su ress and
pro ~ ~t ~ ~ar s, poo , agate e, p~geon ole,
and any other table or implement kept or used
for similar purposes; license and regulate
hotel and tavern keepers, eating houses,
restaurants, theaters, picture shows, merchants,
grocers, peddlers, butchers, slaughterers,
druggists, apothecaries and photographers, and
any business within the town; may prohibit the
manufacturing, selling, giving away or disposition
in any manner of any intoxicating liquor contrary
to law, or the maintaining of places where such
liquors are being kept for such purpose, or the
obtaining of such liquors by fraud from any
practicing physician or druggist, or in any
manner aiding in the selling, giving away,
manufacturing, keeping, distributing or disposition
of such intoxicating liquor contrary to law.
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32-4-17. Retail licenses-Light beer-Sale to
minors. (a) Cities and towns within their
corporate limits, and counties outside of
incorporated cities and towns shall have power
to license, tax, regulate or prohibit the sale
of light beer, at retail, in bottles or draft;
provided, that no such licenses shall be
granted to sell beer in any dance hall, theater
or in the proximity of any church or school.
The commission granting the license shall have
the authority to determine in each case, what
shall constitute proximity. (b) In addition
to other penalties which are provided in this
act, the license of any person to sell light
beer shall either be revoked or suspended for a
period of not less than thirty (30) days, upon
conviction of selling or furnishing beer to a
minor.
(emphasis added) .
Section 7-18 of the Midvale Revised Ordinances, (1951),
authorizes the City Council to revoke licenses when "necessary
for the protection of public peace or morals," and states
that "any license shall be revoked if the . . . licensee .
fails to comply with the ordinances of Midvale City .
The trial Court found that, as a matter of fact,
Appellants' business has experienced "traffic and parking
problems, fights, noise, accidents, obscene conduct, profanity,
trespass and other injurious activities" and that said
injurious activities were contrary to the public peace and
morals of Midvale City (TR 138-141).
The Appellants in the instance case were afforded notice
and a hearing at which the Council heard evidence sufficient
to conclude that JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB created a traffic
problem and a crime problem injurious to the public peace
or morals; that the club constituted a nuisance within the
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meaning of Section 7-2 of the Midvale City Ordinances Revised,
(1951) in that laws or ordinances were violated by its
patrons tending to affect the public health, peace, or morals;
and that the club was in violation of Sections 7-2, 7-10 and
4-34 of the Midvale City Ordinances Revised, (1951), by virtue
of its allowing public dancing without a license and selling
beer to patrons while dancing was in progress (TR 149-142) .
Since the Council's actions were in compliance with due
process and based on substantial evidence, their license
revocation must be upheld.
POINT IV
APPELLANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT THAT
SECTION 7-18 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT PEIU-ITTS THE
REVOCATION OF A BUSINESS LICENSE WITHOUT A
HEARING.
Section 7-18 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City,
(1951), sets forth proceedings and grounds for liquor license
application, rejection, suspension, and revocation of such
licenses:
Section 7-18. The City Council may with or
without a hearing at its discretion, when
in their opinion it is necessary for the
protection of public peace or morals, refuse
to grant any license applie~ for an~ may
revoke any license at any t~me and ~n no
case need any cause be stated. No license
shall be issued and license issued shall
29
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be revoked if the applicant or licensee
shall not possess or shall cease to
possess all of the qualifications required
by the Liquor Control Act and by the
ordinances of Midvale City or fails to
comply with the ordinances of Midvale City
or rules, regulations and orders of the
Board of Health relating to health matters.
Appellants contend that, because the ordinance permits
revocation of a license without a hearing, it is an unconstitutional violation of due process.
Appellants have no standing to make such an assertion.
They received a hearing before the City Council prior to the
revocation of their license and were represented by counsel
at that time:

An asserted violation of due process can be
urged only by those who claim an impairment
of their rights in the application of the
statute to them.
Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978).
In Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669
(1971), Plaintiffs sought to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute requiring permission of local authorities before
a liquor license could be granted.

Since Plaintiffs did

not allege in their Complaint that any local authorities
had refused to give consent for the Liquor Control
Commission to issue them licenses, the Court held that they
had no standing:
Before a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute, he must be adversely
affected by that very statute. The court
will not listen to an objection made as
to the constitutionality of an act by
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parties whose rights are not specifically
affected.
~·

at 671.

Similarly, in Strader v. Kansas Public Employees
Retirement System, supra, the Court dismissed a claim that
the Retirement System violated due process in that it did
not provide for the subpoenaing of witnesses where there
was no indication that the Appellant intended to present
evidence in any form other than oral testimony on his own
behalf.
Constitutionality of legislation or of due
process before an administrative body will
be considered by the courts only where
necessarily involved and such constitutionality may not be questioned by one not
affected by its operation.
479 P.2d at 862.
POINT V
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANTS DO HAVE
STANDING, SECTION 7-18 OF THE MIDVALE CITY
ORDINANCES IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS BY VIRTUE OF THAT ORDINANCE
ALLOWING A LICENSE REVOCATION BY THE CITY
COUNCIL WITH OR WITHOUT A HEARING.
McQuillin states that:
(T]here is no contract or vested right.or
property in a license or permit as aga1nst
the power of the state or a municipality to
revoke it for cause or in the exercise of
the police power to protect the public health,
safety, morals or welfare . . .
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Especially with respect to licenses or
permits for those business, activities or
things potentially or frequently unlawful,
such as the sale of intoxicating liquors,
there is no vested interest in a license
or permit or in its continuance, and it
can be revoked at the pleasure of the
municipality, provided the revocation is
not arbitrary, unreasonable, or
discriminatory.
McQuillin, supra, § 26.81
A majority of jurisdictions agree that the revocation
of a liquor license without notice or hearing does not
violate due process.

Annot., "Right to a hearing before

revocation or suspension of liquor license," 35 A.L.R. 2d
1067 (1945).

It has bng been held that such a license does

not constitute a contractual or vested right, but a mere
permit to do what would otherwise be unlawful.

Thus in

Wallace v. Mayor of the City of Reno, supra, the City
Council's revocation of a retail liquor dealer's license
pursuant to an ordinance allowing such revocation without
notice where there was reason to believe the business constituted a nuisance, a menace to public health or a
detriment to peace or morals was held not to be repugnant
to the state or federal constitution.
In Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d
225 (1940), the Court ruled that a statute giving the
State Revenue Bureau Liquor Control Division the power to
cancel a license for stated causes without notice or hearing
was not an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights
without due process, since the selling of liquor was not a
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property right, but a revocable privilege and no right to
a hearing attached thereto unless so provided by statute.
As late as 1969, in an appeal from an order of sale of a
liquor license to pay indebtedness, the same Court ruled
that, though a liquor license was an attachable property
right vis a vis a third party, there was no vested right
to such license as against the state. Cantrell v. Carnutt,
80 N.M. 519, 458 P.2d 594 (1969).
In State Board of Equalization of California v. The
Superior Court in and for the City and County of San
Francisco, 5 Cal. App. 2d 374, 42 P.2d 1075 (1935), in an
appeal from

~n

injunction granted to tavern owners against

the board, the Court held that the board's independent
investigation required no notice or hearing when it possessed
facts sufficient to support the conclusion that grounds
for revocation existed, since a license was not a property
right within the meaning of the due process clause.
Likewise, the Colorado Court, while acknowledging a
property right in a liquor license, terms such right a
relatively restricted one subject to the regulations under
which it is issued.

New Safari Lounge, Inc. v. The City of

Colorado Springs, 567 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1977).

In considering

the summary suspension of a liquor license for violation of
laws regarding nude entertainment, the court noted that the
purpose of liquor regulatory laws was to allow the sale of
alcoholic beverages while protecting the public health,
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safety, and welfare and that a licensee's rights relative
to the state were narrow, confined and transitory.

There-

fore, a summary suspension followed by a hearing at a
later time did not violate due process.
Similarly, in the instant case, the general due
process requirement of notice and hearing prior to a
deprivation of a "property right," does not exist for the
revocation of a mere privilege, especially in the light of
the fact that independent investigation revealed facts
sufficient to support the revocation.
Equalization of California, supra),

(State Board of

Moreover, JUDD'S

FRONTIER CLUB had been put on notice repeatedly that their
operation constituted a nuisance in violation of Section
7-2 and 7-18 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City,
and Notice and a hearing was had prior to the revocation
(TR 18-21, 9-17, 289, 149-303).

Thus Ordinance 7-18 is

neither unconstitutional on its face, nor as applied to
the instant situation.
POINT VI
SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISANCE SO AS
TO INCLUDE ACTS OF AN ESTABLISHMENT'S
PATRONS DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OR
EQUAL PROTECTION.
Section 7-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City,
1951, defines a nuisance:
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Se~. 7-2:
The
th~s.o:d~n~nce

words and phrases used in
shall have the meanings
spec~f~ed ~n the State Liquor Control Act
un~ess a different meaning is clearly
ev~dent.

Nuisances:
Ariy room, house, building, structure ar
other place or licensed premises where:
(a) alcoholic beverages are manufactured,
sold, kept, bartered, stored, given away
or used, or where persons resort for
drinking alcoholic beverages contrary to
the Liquor Control Act of Utah or this
ordinance, or where (b) Beer is sold
dispensed, or consumed between the h~urs
of one o'clock a.m. and seven o'clock a.m.
or where (c) Minors are permitted to purchase or drink beer or to loiter about or
are employed thereon, or where (d) Laws or
ordinances are violated bh licensees,
a ents, or atrons w~th t e consent or
now e ge o
~censees upon sue
prem~ses
wh~ch tend to affect the publ~c health,
eace or morals are hereb declared to be
The Courts in many jurisdictions, including Utah, are
willing to find the creating of a nuisance by virtue of the
acts of those other than the licensee or his agents under
certain circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Utah has

affirmed an injunction against a business for the creation
of a nuisance by activities of the business's patrons.

In

Wade v. Fuller, 12 Utah 2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961), the
operators of a drive-in restaurant appealed an injunction
issued against them.

The Court, reviewing the evidence

that the business's clientele created loud and disturbing
noises in the residential area, used vulgar language, caused
traffic problems, and urinated on neighboring premises, held
that the

operators could be found reasonably responsible for
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creating a nuisance where they attracted such a clientele.
Sunset Amusement Company v. Board of Police Commissioners '
of the City of Lose Angeles, supra, involved an appeal from
a mandamus proceeding which upheld the board's denial of an
application to renew the operating permit of a roller rink.
The Court affirmed the propriety of a municipality revoking
a business license where such business created a public
nuisance where such nuisance was caused by the acts of the
establishment's patrons.

The court noted that while a

business cannot, in general, be held responsible for governing conditions beyond its control, it concluded that
under certain circumstances such as those presented, a
business catering to the general public would be held
accountable for the unlawful or immoral behavior of its
patrons both on and off its premises, especially where
steps could have been taken by the licensee to help
alleviate the problem.
Similarly, in Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the
Court considered a licensee's liability for patron conduct
in a license revocation proceeding.

The board was sustained

in its findings that the establishment created a public
nuisance by permitting or failing to control patron conduct
which was indecent, lewd and prohibited by law.

Police

testimony as to their arrest of these patrons and police
observation of such indecent conduct was held sufficient
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evidence to uphold the board's findings and its revocation
of the business's operating license.
In an earlier California case, evidence was held
sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction for violation of
a statute prohibiting the conducting of a beer parlor in such
a manner as to create a public nuisance.
137 Cal. App. 784, 28 P.2d 101 (1933).

People v. Montoya,
The Court ruled that

the presence of disorderly crowds in the vicinity of
Defendant's establishment and their disruption of the quiet
neighborhood constituted a violation of the statute.
The law is thus clear:

Where the client conduct is

not outside the control of the business, Sunset Amusement
Co., supra, and where the business caters to the public,
continued noise and disruption in the vicinity has been held
to be within the business's control, People v. Montoya,
supra, then the business may be held responsible Wade v.
Fuller, supra.

In view of the repeated acts constituting a

nuisance by JUDD'S patrons, then it is pursuant to a long
and respected line of authority that JUDD'S may be held
liable for the violation of Midvale City Ordinance, Section
7-2.
POINT VII
SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISMlCE, DOES NOT
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY INSUFFICIENT DEFINITENESS
OR FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE AS TO THE CONDUCT
PROHIBITED.
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The Supreme Court of Utah ruled on the constitutionality
of a Salt Lake City loitering ordinance in Salt Lake City v.
Savage, 541 P.2d 1035
915.

(Utah, 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.

Holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally

vague, the Court noted that legislative enactments are
presumatively valid and constitutional and are not to be
struck down unless shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision
and that the burden of such a showing rests with the party
challenging the enactment.
In Sunset Amusement Co. v. The Board of Police
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the city
ordinance authorizing denial of an operating license to an
establishment if such a business would be detrimental to
the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, or
general welfare of the public was held to provide adequate
standards and was not unconstitutionally vague.

The Court

observed that in drafting its ordinances, a municipality
cannot be expected to isolate and specify all conduct
proscribed.
Similarly, in Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the
Court ruled that an ordinance providing for license
revocation on evidence that the business was carried on in
an unlawful, improper, or irregular manner was a sufficiently
clear and ascertainable standard, and not in violation of
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due process.
The Utah Supreme Court held void for vagueness a
criminal statute requiring registration with the State
Industrial Commission of a prospective worker, where his
employer was being struck by any "nationally recognized
union."

State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).

In that case, the Court announced its standards for reviewing
such a constitutional challenge.

The Court asserted that a

statute would not be held void for uncertainty if it might be
given any sensible practical effect.

A statute which forbids

or requires an act in such vague terms that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application is violative of due process.

However,

the Court noted that due to the limitations of language,
neither absolute exactness of expression nor complete precision of meaning are expected.

Here, where a criminal penalty

was exacted, the Court was unwilling to force a prospective
worker to judge the national recognition of any particular
striking union.
The ordinance in question mentions violations "which
tend to affect the public health, peace or morals."

Surely

it is within the common understanding (and does not require
unnecessary guesswork) that such patron conduct as fights,
noise, accidents, obscene conduct, profanity and trespass
(requiring a substantial burden placed on Midvale City's
police force) constitute at the very least an infringement on
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public health and peace.
POINT VIII
THE CITY COUNCIL'S CHARGE AND FINDING THAT
APPELLANT WAS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4-25
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF MIDVALE CITY,
REQUIRING LICENSING OF A DANCE HALL, WAS NOT
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS OR
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY REASON OF THEIR
LACK OF NOTICE OR BY DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT.
The application for and receipt of a license puts a
licensee on notice of regulations thereto.
v. County of Adams, 36 Colo

Chroma Corporation

App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975).

The California Court in Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, rejected the Appellant's constitutional challenge with regard
to his notice of municipal ordinances.

The Court ruled that

a business owner is charged with notice of municipal code
sections regarding regulation of his business or grounds for
license denial.
In the case of Condas v. Board of Salt Lake County
Commissioners, 5 Utah 2d 1, 295 P.2d 829 (1956), which was
an action for declaratory judgment to construe a county
ordinance defining a nuisance as any building where dancing
is permitted. on premises licensed to sell beer, the Utah
Court held that the statute was not invalid as to holders
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of beer and cabaret licenses who allegedly were led to
believe that dancing was permissible by failure of the
commissioners to complain.
Earl and Sons Tire Center, Inc. v. City of Boulder
Board of Appeals, 559 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1977), involved the
refusal by the chief of the City's Bureau of Fire Prevention
to grant Plaintiff an exception to the city's sprinkler
requirement.

In ruling on the Plaintiff's appeal from the

order to install such sprinklers, the Court acknowledged that
a facially valid municipal regulation may not be discriminatorily enforced, but held that the complainant must show
more than that the ordinance was not enforced against others.
There must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.
In that case, such showing was insufficient; the fact that
some other businesses were not in compliance with the
sprinkler requirement was not enough proof of discriminatory
enforcement.
Likewise, in the instant case, the allegation that
JUDD'S was given no notice of the dancing ordinance does not
make out a violation of due process or equal protection in
that the proprietors are charged with notice of such
ordinance.

Further, the charge of discriminatory enforcement

of that ordinance cannot be proved by a mere showing that
others similarly situated were not required to obtain a license
for dancing.

"A discriminatory purpose must be shown clearly

by one claiming discrimination since such a purpose cannot be
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presumed."

State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. 355, 517 P.2d

212 (1973).
POINT IX
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN RESPONDENTS ' MOTION AND AMEND
ITS ORDER.
On June 25, 1979, the trial Court entered its Order in
this matter (TR 128-129).

This was done without formal

entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Two (2)

days later, on June 27, 1979, the Appellants filed their
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (TR 130).

Four

(4) days after the entry of Judgment, on June 29, 1979,
Respondents filed their Motion to Amend Findings and Order,
which was granted on the same day (TR 136).

Appellants now

contend that, because their Notice of Appeal was filed
before the Respondents made their motion, the trial Court
was without jurisdiction to hear the matter.
This position is untenable.

The relevant Rule here is

52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It provides:

(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made
not later than ten days after entry of
judgment, the court may amend its findings
or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question
has made in the District Court an objection to
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such findings or has made either a motion
to am~nd them, a motion for judgment, or
a mot~on for a new trial.
Respondent clearly complied with the ten-day requirement.
If such compliance could be circumvented by a quick filing
of a Notice of Appeal, the provisions would cease to have
any meaning.

Wright and Miller, commenting on the nearly

identical provision in the Federal Rules, state:

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil§ 2582 (1971).
Attacking Appellants' position from a different vantage,
it can be argued that, since Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are required by Utah Rule 52(a) and, since Utah Rule
72 requires appeal to be taken from final judgments, no appeal
may be properly taken until Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law have been entered.

In Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324,

481 P.2d 53 (1971), the Court, in fact, made such a determination, holding that, where the trial Court orally found the
Defendant in contempt for violation of an injunction, but did
not make and enter Findings of Fact and Judgment, there was
no final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.

In
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accord is Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121,
1124 (Utah, 1974), where the Court states:
The timely filing of any of the motions
allowed by the rules to attack or change
the findings and judgment involves the
continuing jurisdiction of the court and
suspends the running of time on the
judgment until the motion is ruled upon.
A final decision to note here is Ellison v. Johnson,
18 Utah 2d 374, 423 P.2d 657 (1967).

There the Appellants

moved for reversal on grounds that the trial Court did not
file its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law until 19
days after entry of judgment.

The Court, sustaining the

judgment below, held that, since Appellants had failed to
show any prejudice as a result of the late filing, they were
not entitled to relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

' 1980.

~~;do.U--rt/~,
Attorney for Respondents
7417 South State Street, Suite 1
Midvale, Utah 84047
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I hereby certify that three (3) copies of the Brief
of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to NICK J.
COLESSIDES, Esq., Attorney for Appellants, 610 East South
Temple, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 this

It'

day of March, 1980.
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